论文标题
在困境游戏中的策略均衡和非对角线的回报扰动
Strategy equilibrium in dilemma games with off-diagonal payoff perturbations
论文作者
论文摘要
我们分析了两性游戏的策略均衡，考虑到受到偏离对基因的小小的和随机扰动影响的回报矩阵。 值得注意的是，最近的一项工作[1]报告说，尽管合作受到对对角线的扰动的维持，但当扰动对非对角线作用时，出现了不太明显的情况。因此，第二种情况代表了本调查的核心，旨在完成对收益扰动对进化游戏动态的影响的描述。我们的结果是通过在各种配置下分析所提出的模型（作为不同的更新规则）来实现的，这表明偏离扰动实际上构成了一种非平凡的噪声形式。特别是，最有趣的效果是在相转换附近检测到的，因为扰动倾向于将策略分布转移到非命令的平衡状态，在叛逃遍布人群时支持合作，并在相反的情况下支持叛逃。总而言之，我们确定了一种噪声形式，在受控条件下，可以使用来增强合作，并大大延迟其灭绝。
We analyse the strategy equilibrium of dilemma games considering a payoff matrix affected by small and random perturbations on the off-diagonal. Notably, a recent work [1] reported that, while cooperation is sustained by perturbations acting on the main diagonal, a less clear scenario emerges when perturbations act on the off-diagonal. Thus, the second case represents the core of this investigation, aimed at completing the description of the effects that payoff perturbations have on the dynamics of evolutionary games. Our results, achieved by analysing the proposed model under a variety of configurations, as different update rules, suggest that off-diagonal perturbations actually constitute a non-trivial form of noise. In particular, the most interesting effects are detected near the phase transition, as perturbations tend to move the strategy distribution towards non-ordered states of equilibrium, supporting cooperation when defection is pervading the population, and supporting defection in the opposite case. To conclude, we identified a form of noise that, under controlled conditions, could be used to enhance cooperation, and greatly delay its extinction.
