论文标题
为什么要借钱的时候？
Why Stake When You Can Borrow?
论文作者
论文摘要
随着智能合同平台自主管理数十亿美元的资本，量化投资者在这些系统中产生的投资组合风险越来越重要。最近的工作表明，股份证明（POS）容易受到链贷款贷款引起的金融攻击的攻击，并且比工作证明（POW）\ cite {fandi_pos_econ}具有更差的资本效率。已经提出了许多提高资本效率的方法，使Stakers可以在其固定资产上提出可函数的衍生品主张。在本文中，我们构建了一个统一模型，用于研究这些建议的安全风险。该模型结合了来自信用衍生品文献改编以评估令牌不平等和返回概况的生育堕胎过程和风险模型。我们发现“安全”和“不安全”的衍生产品之间存在急剧的过渡。令人惊讶的是，我们发现与\ cite {fanti2019 compounding}相反，存在衍生品可以\ emph {降低}财富集中在这些网络中的条件。该模型还适用于分散的财务（DEFI）协议，在该方案中，将存储资产用作保险。我们的理论结果使用基于代理的仿真验证。
As smart contract platforms autonomously manage billions of dollars of capital, quantifying the portfolio risk that investors engender in these systems is increasingly important. Recent work illustrates that Proof of Stake (PoS) is vulnerable to financial attacks arising from on-chain lending and has worse capital efficiency than Proof of Work (PoW) \cite{fanti_pos_econ}. Numerous methods for improving capital efficiency have been proposed that allow stakers to create fungible derivative claims on their staked assets. In this paper, we construct a unifying model for studying the security risks of these proposals. This model combines birth-death Pólya processes and risk models adapted from the credit derivatives literature to assess token inequality and return profiles. We find that there is a sharp transition between 'safe' and 'unsafe' derivative usage. Surprisingly, we find that contrary to \cite{fanti2019compounding} there exist conditions where derivatives can \emph{reduce} concentration of wealth in these networks. This model also applies to Decentralized Finance (DeFi) protocols where staked assets are used as insurance. Our theoretical results are validated using agent-based simulation.
