论文标题
联合干预网络的福利和分配效应
Welfare and Distributional Effects of Joint Intervention in Networks
论文作者
论文摘要
我们研究了计划者在网络上的独立边际实用程序中的最佳干预措施，并在连接播放器的链接上进行了权重。福利最大化的联合干预措施表现出以下特性：（a）计划者的预算中等（使最佳干预措施是室内装饰）时，任何连接一对玩家的链接的重量的变化与对双人的特征中心的产物成正比； （b）当预算足够大时，最佳网络采用了一个简单的形式：它是战略补充下的完整网络，或者是战略替代品下的完整平衡的二手网络。我们表明，关节干预的福利效应是由主要特征值塑造的，而分布效应是通过相应特征值的分散体捕获的，即特征中心。如Galeotti等人所研究的那样，将我们的环境中的联合干预与单一干预仅在独立的边际公用事具上进行比较。 （2020年），我们发现联合干预始终产生更高的总福利，但可能导致更大的不平等，这突出了联合干预的福利和分配影响之间的可能权衡。
We study a planner's optimal interventions in both the standalone marginal utilities of players on a network and weights on the links that connect players. The welfare-maximizing joint intervention exhibits the following properties: (a) when the planner's budget is moderate (so that optimal interventions are interior), the change in weight on any link connecting a pair of players is proportional to the product of eigen-centralities of the pair; (b) when the budget is sufficiently large, the optimal network takes a simple form: It is either a complete network under strategic complements or a complete balanced bipartite network under strategic substitutes. We show that the welfare effect of joint intervention is shaped by the principal eigenvalue, while the distributional effect is captured by the dispersion of the corresponding eigenvalues, i.e., the eigen-centralities. Comparing joint intervention in our setting with single intervention solely on the standalone marginal utilities, as studied by Galeotti et al. (2020), we find that joint intervention always yields a higher aggregate welfare, but may lead to greater inequality, which highlights a possible trade-off between the welfare and distributional impacts of joint intervention.
