论文标题
排名最少的机制的不可思议的操作性
Non-Obvious Manipulability of the Rank-Minimizing Mechanism
论文作者
论文摘要
在分配问题中，分配对象的等级分布通常用于评估匹配质量。排名最少（RM）机制直接优化平均等级。虽然吸引人，但缺点是RM机制并非具有策略性。本文研究了RM是否满足了非显而易见的可操作性的较弱的激励概念（Nom，Troyan和Morrill，2020年）。我显示了具有全部支持的任何RM机制 - 将正概率放在所有排名最少分配上 - 是NOM。特别是，统一的随机化满足了这种情况。如果没有全部支持，是否命名RM机制取决于选择规则的细节。
In assignment problems, the rank distribution of assigned objects is often used to evaluate match quality. Rank-minimizing (RM) mechanisms directly optimize for average rank. While appealing, a drawback is RM mechanisms are not strategyproof. This paper investigates whether RM satisfies the weaker incentive notion of non-obvious manipulability (NOM, Troyan and Morrill, 2020). I show any RM mechanism with full support - placing positive probability on all rank-minimizing allocations - is NOM. In particular, uniform randomization satisfies this condition. Without full support, whether an RM mechanism is NOM or not depends on the details of the selection rule.
