论文标题
Phishclone:测量克隆逃避攻击的功效
PhishClone: Measuring the Efficacy of Cloning Evasion Attacks
论文作者
论文摘要
基于Web的网络钓鱼占数据泄露的90%以上,大多数Web浏览器和安全供应商都依赖机器学习(ML)模型作为缓解。尽管如此,还显示出在抗钓鱼聚合物(例如网络和Virustotal)上定期发布的链接可轻松绕过现有的探测器。先前的艺术表明,随着光突变的自动网站克隆正在吸引攻击者。这在当前文献中的暴露量有限,并导致基于ML的基于ML的对策。这里的工作进行了第一项经验研究,该研究在广泛的循环中汇编和评估了各种最先进的克隆技术。我们收集了13,394个样品,发现了8,566个确认的网络钓鱼页面,使用7种不同的克隆机制针对4个流行网站。这些样品用在受控平台中删除的恶意代码复制,该平台加强了预防措施,以防止意外访问。然后,我们将站点报告给Virustotal和其他平台,并定期对结果进行7天的调查,以确定每种克隆技术的功效。结果表明,没有安全供应商检测到我们的克隆,证明了对更有效的检测器的迫切需求。最后,我们提出了4项建议,以帮助网络开发人员和基于ML的防御能力减轻克隆攻击的风险。
Web-based phishing accounts for over 90% of data breaches, and most web-browsers and security vendors rely on machine-learning (ML) models as mitigation. Despite this, links posted regularly on anti-phishing aggregators such as PhishTank and VirusTotal are shown to easily bypass existing detectors. Prior art suggests that automated website cloning, with light mutations, is gaining traction with attackers. This has limited exposure in current literature and leads to sub-optimal ML-based countermeasures. The work herein conducts the first empirical study that compiles and evaluates a variety of state-of-the-art cloning techniques in wide circulation. We collected 13,394 samples and found 8,566 confirmed phishing pages targeting 4 popular websites using 7 distinct cloning mechanisms. These samples were replicated with malicious code removed within a controlled platform fortified with precautions that prevent accidental access. We then reported our sites to VirusTotal and other platforms, with regular polling of results for 7 days, to ascertain the efficacy of each cloning technique. Results show that no security vendor detected our clones, proving the urgent need for more effective detectors. Finally, we posit 4 recommendations to aid web developers and ML-based defences to alleviate the risks of cloning attacks.