论文标题
N-玩家游戏中的理性和正确性
Rationality and correctness in n-player games
论文作者
论文摘要
在两人游戏中，有两个众所周知的NASH平衡条件：合理性的相互知识和猜想的相互知识。 MKR假设合理性的概念是相互已知的。相比之下，猜想的相互知识假定给定的猜想特征是相互已知的，长期以来一直被认为是一个有力的假设。在本说明中，我们介绍了“合理性和正确性相互假设”（MARC）的概念，该概念在概念上与MKR假设更紧密地一致。我们提出两个主要结果。我们的第一个结果表明，马克在每两人的零和比赛中都有。在我们的第二个定理中，我们表明MARC在N-player Games中一般都没有。
There are two well-known sufficient conditions for Nash equilibrium in two-player games: mutual knowledge of rationality (MKR) and mutual knowledge of conjectures. MKR assumes that the concept of rationality is mutually known. In contrast, mutual knowledge of conjectures assumes that a given profile of conjectures is mutually known, which has long been recognized as a strong assumption. In this note, we introduce a notion of "mutual assumption of rationality and correctness" (MARC), which conceptually aligns more closely with the MKR assumption. We present two main results. Our first result establishes that MARC holds in every two-person zero-sum game. In our second theorem, we show that MARC does not in general hold in n-player games.
