论文标题
探索太阳能地球工程协议的稳定性
Exploring the stability of solar geoengineering agreements
论文作者
论文摘要
引入了一个简单的模型来研究国家在太阳能工程方面的合作行为。通过数值方法探索了该模型的结果。一个普遍的发现是，在太阳能工程上的国家之间的合作与协调非常激励。此外，国家之间太阳能地球工程协议的稳定性至关重要地取决于太阳能工程的风险。如果认为太阳能工程的风险更高，则最稳定的太阳能地球工程协议的稳定性将降低。但是，协议的稳定性完全独立于国家偏好。
A simple model is introduced to study the cooperative behavior of nations regarding solar geoengineering. The results of this model are explored through numerical methods. A general finding is that cooperation and coordination between nations on solar geoengineering is very much incentivized. Furthermore, the stability of solar geoengineering agreements between nations crucially depends on the perceived riskiness of solar geoengineering. If solar geoengineering is perceived as riskier, the stability of the most stable solar geoengineering agreements is reduced. However, the stability of agreements is completely independent of countries preferences.
