学术文献库

Identifying the actual adversarial threat against a system vulnerability has been a long-standing challenge for cybersecurity research. To determine an optimal strategy for the defender, game-theoretic based decision models have been widely used to simulate the real-world attacker-defender scenarios while taking the defender's constraints into consideration. In this work, we focus on understanding human attacker behaviors in order to optimize the defender's strategy. To achieve this goal, we model attacker-defender engagements as Markov Games and search for their Bayesian Stackelberg Equilibrium. We validate our modeling approach and report our empirical findings using a Capture-The-Flag (CTF) setup, and we conduct user studies on adversaries with varying skill-levels. Our studies show that application-level deceptions are an optimal mitigation strategy against targeted attacks -- outperforming classic cyber-defensive maneuvers, such as patching or blocking network requests. We use this result to further hypothesize over the attacker's behaviors when trapped in an embedded honeypot environment and present a detailed analysis of the same.